Using the unique combined dataset of three previous surveys, this paper examines the effects of corporate governance on the performance of large private enterprises in Vietnam.
Ⅰ. Introduction
Research on corporate governance has been well documented in the literature, especially since the collapse of many large corporations such as Enron, Xerox, Tyco, and WorldCom in the early 2000s. Accounting scandals implicitly took place inside those corporations due to lack of efficient mechanisms on corporate governance. As a result, there was a wave of regulations on corporate governance to aid in preventing similar problems occurring in the future. Those regulations focused on improving the corporate governance environment, calling for strict application of principles of corporate governance, implementing guidelines on the independence of the board of directors and audit committees of firms. Sound corporate governance is so important that both the NASDAQ stock market and New York Stock Exchange require listed companies to have a majority of independent directors. Regulations on corporate governance were enacted in those listed firms to enhance their corporate government mechanism as the priority of financial revolution, increase of public confidence, enhancement of corporate governance, and assurance of firm development.
The private sector is the most dynamic and economically efficient sector in the Vietnamese economy. It plays a significant role, generating 49.4 percent of total GDP and employing 86.3 percent of the total labor force (GSO, 2013) . While state owned enterprises show their inefficiency, private counterparts have been significantly developing, particularly after the introduction of the Law on Enterprise 2005. Many private enterprises have developed and become large companies that follow models of economic groups. In practice, however, private economic groups (or large private enterprises, hereafter used interchangeably) are facing many issues, which originate from week corporate governance. Main owners of large private enterprises commonly have cross-ownership in many other companies and financial institutions, and decision making of those enterprises is mostly made by those cross-ownership shareholders. It is "bad" corporate governance that can cause serious consequences such as erosion of competitiveness, undermining innovation, and eliminating transparency, accountability, and economic efficiency. In the context of Vietnam, hidden agreements, cross-ownership, and lack of transparency and accountability in large private enterprises likely lead to an unfair business environments, conflicting interest groups, corruption, and ultimately instability of the macroeconomic structure (Le, 2013) .
Studies on the impacts of corporate governance on performance of the firms are intensively documented in the literature, and empirical results are largely differentiated because of the wide range of measurements for corporate governance. By using the different proxies for corporate governance and different datasets, the empirical results are also diversified. For example, studies that used the independence of the board of directors as a measure of corporate governance found that increasing independence of the board of directors is strongly associated with better firm performance (Bhagat & Black, 2002; Hermalin & Weisbach, 1998 , 2003 , but recently Bhagat and Bolton,(2008) found a negative relationship between board independence and operating performance.; Bhagat, Carey, and Elson(1999) found that the size of the board is negatively linked to the performance of firms while CEO duality concluded ambiguous empirical results (Brickley, Coles, and Jarrell, 1997) . This research topic, however, has not been intensively studied in Vietnam yet because of a limited dataset to support this kind of research. To our knowledge, Vo and Phan(2013) is among one of the first papers that examined the effects of corporate governance on firm performance in Vietnam. By applying FGLS estimation methods for 77 listed firms on the Ho Chi Minh Stock Exchange and which were continuously active during the period from 2006-2011, this paper found that duality is associated with better performance, the size of the board of directors is negatively linked to firm performance, and the structure of ownership has no linear relationship with the performance of surveyed firms. Along with Vo and Phan (2013), this paper is among the pioneering papers on investigating the impacts of corporate governance on the performance of large private enterprises in Vietnam.
The primary objective of this paper is twofold: to develop a dataset describing governance and performance of large private enterprises and to investigate the impacts of corporate governance on the performance of large private enterprises (or private economic groups) in Vietnam. This paper used a unique dataset of the combined enterprise surveys conducted by GSO, by VNR's 500 private enterprises completed by VNR Vietnam Report and Vietnamnet, and by the Research Project Code II.5.2-2012.3, this paper found that different measures of corporate governance have different effects on firm performance, which is proxied by return on assets (ROA), before-tax profits, and state budget contribution. For the surveyed sample, duality is positively associated with better performance regardless of its measures, while the size of the board negatively affects performance of large private enterprises. Those results do not differ across sectors. The empirical results also support projections of managerial theory, stewardship theory on the importance of Chair-CEO duality and the size of the board. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the relevant literature and motivates our key hypotheses. Section 3 introduces the development of our dataset and model specifications. Section 4 presents the results on the relationship between corporate governance and performance of large private enterprises in Vietnam. Section 5 summarizes our key findings and concludes the paper.
Ⅱ. Literature Review
Studies on corporate governance and its effects on firm performance are quite well documented in the literature. This section briefly provides measurements of corporate governance and firm performance, and it also reviews the effects of corporate governance on firm performance commonly found in the literature. This review aids in understanding and applying measurements of corporate governance and firm performance in the Vietnamese context in this paper.
Measure of Corporate Governance
The term "corporate governance" is initially associated with the "principalagent" problem. At the firm level, a "principal-agent" means a person who owns a firm but is not the same person who controls it. In this sense, corporate governance is initiates from private sector and its conception traditionally focuses on the corporationshareholder relationship. OECD(2004) provides a broader definition of corporate governance as "the full set of relationships among a company's management, its board, its shareholders and other stakeholders. It provides the structure through which the objectives of the company are set, and the means of attaining those objectives and monitoring performance determined." Another definition of corporate governance is provided by Barrett (2002) who said that this pertained to the ways an organization deals with its various stakeholders. According to the World Bank (1999) while still others (Bhagat & Bolton, 2008) focused on median directordollar value ownership and median director-percent value ownership as proxies for corporate governance. Corporate governance is also measured by using comprehensive indexes. For example, Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) constructed the so-called Gindex, consolidated from 24 variables, in which a higher G-index indicates more restrictions on shareholder rights or a greater number of anti-takeover measures. Another complicated measure of corporate governance which is based on six of the twenty-four G-Index provision is the E-index, developed by Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell(2009) . A high E-index is associated with weak shareholder rights. These indexes are considered as indicators of external corporate governance and commonly used to investigate the effects of interaction between several governance measures on firm performance. However, the use of these indexes is limited since it is difficult for researchers to obtain data for calculating them (Cremers & Nair, 2005) . For this reason, separate metrics of corporate governance are preferred in the empirical analyses of corporate governance and firm performance.
Performance of the Enterprises
Many studies have developed indicators which are used to measure the performance of firms from different perspectives for a wide range of purposes. Richard et al.(2009) conducted a review of measurements of performance in related papers published in the top five management journals during 2002 and 2007, and they found little scientific debate on which measures are appropriate and how to combine measures in order to compare business performance. To investigate the relationship between corporate performance and performance of firms, several measurements of firm performance have been used. According to Bhagat and Bolton(2008) Because of data collection issues, many studies on this topic use only a single indicator of corporate performance. Return on assets, before-tax profits and payment to state budget are the three most often used performance measures.
Corporate Governance and Enterprise Performance
Empirical results on the effects of corporate governance on firm performance widely vary across proxies of corporate governance and firm performance variables. To review, variables of corporate governance commonly used are board size, independence of board of directors, Chair-CEO duality, G-index, and E-index; while corporate performance variables mostly include returns on assets (ROA) and Tobin's Q.
The size of the board of directors has an ambiguous effect on ROA. For example, Lipton and Lorsch(1992) , Jensen(1993 ), Yermack(1996 , and Coles, Daniel and Naveen (2008) argue and empirically find that smaller board size is associated with more success of the firms; while many other studies find opposite empirical results (Klein, 1998; Dalton et al., 1999; Coles et al., 2008) . Similarly, the effects of independence of the board of directors on firm performance are also mixed. Using different performance measures, Bhagat and Black(2002) find that firms with more independent boards do not perform better, and they also conclude that poorly performing firms are more likely to have more independent directors. Bhagat and Bolton(2008) find a negative relationship between board independence and firm performance. Bhagat and Bolton(2009) document that having a more independent board of directors does not lead to better performance and may actually lead to worse performance. Edward and Clough(2005) provide further review on this issue.
Using the G-index as a proxy for corporate governance, Bolton (2008, 2009 ) find that stronger corporate governance strongly associates with higher operating performance with a variety of performance measures, including ROA and Tobin's Q. This empirical result is also true for the E-index. For example, a firm with a higher E-index has lower firm valuation (Core, Guay & Rusticus, 2007; Cremers & Nair, 2005) . These mixed empirical results are also found in a review of Bolton (2008, 2009) and Edward and Clough (2005) .
Other measures of corporate governance such as duality (separation of chairman and CEO) also have a mixed effect on firm performance. For example, Donaldson and David(1991) argue that an independent chair will enhance the board's capacity to achieve business goals because the board provides a mechanism for keeping managerial actions in-check. Kocourek et al.(2003) add that there is no one to talk openly and in depth to about the difficulties faced by organizations, and the chair can play this supportive role in this case. Heracleous(2001) provides empirical evidence that whether the chair and CEO are separate or the same person does not appear to make much difference on the performance of firms.
It is obvious from the literature that the impacts of corporate governance on the performance of firms are ambiguous or mixed. The empirical results of those various studies are different due to differences in measures of corporate governance and a variety of performance measurements. Using the unique combination of available dataset and survey on large-scale private enterprises, this paper tries to further empirically investigate this relationship in the context of Vietnam. Particularly, this paper will examine the effects of corporate governance measured by duality, size of board, independence of board, and presence of female board members on the performance of large private enterprises as measured by ROA, before-tax profits, and their annual budget contribution.
Ⅲ. Methodology

Framework
Data and Variables
Data used in this paper was collected from a combination of three sources. The first data set is the Enterprise Survey, which was conducted by the General Statistical Office of Vietnam. This is an annual survey and the sample size is very large, like a census. For example, there were 358,557 enterprises in all sectors surveyed in 2012. This data source provides all the information needed including firm characteristics, financial results, among others and covers two years; 2011 and 2012. The second data set is from the survey conducted by VNR Vietnam Report and Vietnamnet. This survey consists of 500 of the largest private enterprises currently operating in Vietnam. In this paper, those enterprises are considered as private economic groups. This data set includes information such as the name, CEO, and business registration of these enterpriese. The third data set is the survey conducted by the group which worked on Research Project Code II.5.2-2012.3. Based on the surveyed enterprises in the VNR Vietnam Report and Vietnamnet data set, we asked questions on corporate governance issues. Because each enterprise has a unique taxation code and those codes are available in all surveys, the taxation codes become the key for combining the three data sets from the three surveys.
Variables are purposely divided into three groups: (i) variables measuring firm performance, (ii corporate governance, and (iii) other variables of firms. Definitions and measurements of all variables used in the paper are provided in Table 1 . The questionnaires were sent to 500 of the largest private enterprises (according to the ranking of VNR500-2013) and the survey was conducted either through face-to-face or telephone interviews or through email. Secondary data were obtained and consolidation from the enterprises' annual financial reports was done. Approximately 277 enterprises responded to the survey, but only data from 254 enterprises were used for this analysis due to missing key indicator data necessary for analysis. Those private economic groups under study were gathered from the survey of the NVR Vietnam Report and Vietnamnet. Female-CEO enterprises display worse performance than male-CEO counterparts.
A similar result can be observed across sectors, especially in the industry and service sectors. These results will be thoroughly tested later.
Estimated Models
In investigating the impacts of corporate governance on the performance of large private enterprises in Vietnam. Table 2 give no evidence of heteroscedasticity in the regression models.
In order to estimate the effects of governance on firm performance, this paper employs three measures for firm performance and five measures for corporate governance. The estimated effects of corporate governance on three aspects of firm performance are presented in Table 3 .
Chair-CEO duality has a positive and significant effect on firm performance. With three proxies of firm performance, estimated results consistently and statistically significantly imply that Chair-CEO duality increases firm performance. This empirical result supports the managerial theory and stewardship theory (Davis, Schoorman & Donaldson, 1997) and previous empirical results of Daily and Dalton(1997) and Rechner and Dalton (1991) . Chair-CEO duality is considered to foster and unify leadership rather than weaken the independence of the board from management and monitoring roles. Thus, it does not reduce the supervision of the board over firm activities and performance, and helps increase the efficiency of the firm. In the context of Vietnam, Chair-CEO duality increases the power of the CEO, enabling him or her to appropriately respond to dynamic <Tabl e 3> Effects of corporate governance on l arge pri vate enterpri ses i n Vi etnam Significant coefficients at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels are noted by ***, ** and *, respectively. events amidst a more transparent Vietnamese economy. This result suggests that it is not necessary to separate the CEO and Chair in private enterprises in order to pursue and attain better performance within the enterprises. When using size of the board as a measure of governance, estimated results shows a negative and statistically significant effect on firm performance. Holding other variables constant, an additional member in the board would decrease ROA of the firm by 1.2%, annually. This estimated result is corroborated by empirical findings in literature. A large board size enterprise often has diversity of opinions that take time to get these board members into consensus model and thus this can negatively impact on decision making relative strategic issues or business development directions. Another estimated result shows that a larger executive board is statistically and significantly associated with better performance of enterprises. This suggests that diversity of opinion on daily operating decisions would reduce the risks of business and eventually improve firm performance.
Other measures of corporate governance such as gender of CEO and independence of the board do not statistically or significantly affect the performance of the enterprises. A possible reason for this result is that the number of female-CEO enterprises in the sample and the number of independent board members are so small that they do not make a significant contribution to corporate performance.
One notable estimated result here is that leverage has negatively and statistically significant effects on firm performance in all three measures. This implies that a firm having more long-term debts would be associated with worse performance because higher leverage means higher agency costs and diverging interests across managers, shareholders, and debtholders. Thus, it should be considered a moral hazard issue that causes leverage to negatively link to performance. This is very true in the Vietnamese context, particularly in the current condition marked by economic difficulties. Over a long period or from October 2009 to June 2012, interest rates for bank loans were kept at a significantly high level, at almost 20% annually, and even more than 20% for some unofficial financial intermediaries. Debt financing and interest payment obligations put pressure on managers to perform in such a way to reduce "free cash-flow," or else be under threat of bankruptcy if these obligations cannot be satisfied.
The paper also estimated models that included interaction terms of Chair-CEO duality and the sector which the firm belonged to, in order to determine if Chair-CEO duality has different effects on the performance of firms in different sectors. Estimated results showed no difference in firm performance across sectors due to Chair-CEO duality or between female and male CEO enterprises. Similar empirical results were also found for interaction terms of Chair-CEO duality and export-import related enterprises.
Ⅴ. Conclusion and
Recommendations
This paper is one of the pioneer studies on the relationship between corporate governance and performance of firms in Vietnam. This research has provided new evidence on the relationship between corporate governance and performance of large private enterprises in Vietnam. We used the unique combined data set of three previous surveys: the enterprise survey in 2013, the survey of the 500 largest private enterprises in 2013, and the survey under the research project code Ⅱ.5.2-2012.3 for this assignment. Initially, tests for multicollinearity and heteroscedasticity of the data and estimated models were conducted to make sure estimates were consistent. Next, the paper developed five measures of corporate governance (Chair-CEO duality, size of the board, gender of CEO, size of the executive board, and independence of the board) and three variables for performance (before-tax profits, contribution to state budget, and return on assets) to investigate the effects of corporate governance on firm performance. Estimated results show mixed effects of corporate governance on the performance of private enterprises.
In the context of state-owned enterprises with low efficiency, development of the private enterprises should be a focus for economic growth and development of the country. Based on the empirical results, good corporate governance practice would strongly associate with better performance of private enterprises. This suggests that Chair-CEO duality is not necessarily "bad" for the firm's performance since, Chair-CEO duality would unify the leadership to respond to dynamic changes and information asymmetries in the Vietnamese economy. 
